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FIGHTING WORDS IN THE ERA OF TEXTS, IMS
AND E-MAILS:
CAN A DISPARAGED DOCTRINE BE
RESUSCITATED TO PUNISH CYBER-BULLIES?
Clay Calvert'
One of the few traditional categories of expression falling
outside the ambit of First Amendment2 protection - one of the socalled "categorical carve-outs"' - is the much-maligned 4 class of
1. Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and
Director of the Marion B. Brechner First Amendment Project at the University
of Florida, Gainesville, Fla. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University;
J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the
Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar
of California. The author thanks students Olivia Edinger, Peter Posada,
Rebekah Rich and Mirelis Torres of the University of Florida for their help on
this article.
2. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press. . . ." U.S. CONsr. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free
Press Clauses were incorporated eighty-six years ago through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities
and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3. Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 199 (6th Cir. 2010).
Several other categories of speech also fall outside the scope of First
Amendment protection. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1580
(2010) (identifying categories of historically and traditionally unprotected
content to include: a) obscenity; b) defamation; c) fraud; d) incitement; and e)
speech integral to criminal conduct); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal.,
535 U.S. 234, 245-246 (2002) (providing that "as a general principle, the First
Amendment bars the government from dictating what we see or read or speak or
hear. The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain
categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and
pornography produced with real children") (emphasis added); IMS Health Inc.
v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008) (identifying "agreements in restraint
of trade," "statements or actions creating hostile work environments" and
"promises of benefits made by an employer during a union election" as "other
species of speech-related regulations that effectively lie beyond the reach of the
First Amendment" despite the fact that "for whatever reason, the Justices have
never deemed it necessary to address why or how these content-based
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speech known as fighting words.' The United States Supreme
Court wrote in a unanimous opinion nearly seventy years ago in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire that:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or 'fighting" words - those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an

immediate breach of the peace.'
Since Justice Frank Murphy penned those words, however, the
Supreme Court and lower judicial bodies have nibbled away at the
fighting words exception. Indeed, as the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit recently wrote, the fighting words
doctrine is now "extremely narrow."'
For instance, there is growing agreement that the first part of the
definition - words that "by their very utterance inflict injury"' has been implicitly jettisoned to the ash can of Constitutional
refuse.'
As First Amendment scholar and current Furman
prohibitions manage to escape First Amendment scrutiny").
4. See, e.g., Burton Caine, The Trouble with "Fighting Words": Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire is a Threat to First Amendment Values and Should be
Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REv. 441, 444 (2004) (lambasting the fighting words
doctrine as "a category so ill-conceived that not once in the ensuing sixty-two
years has the United States Supreme Court upheld a conviction based on it," and
asserting that "there is no constitutional basis for denying protection to fighting
words, either alone or as a subcategory of speech claimed to be unworthy of
First Amendment protection").
5. See Edward J. Eberle, Hate Speech, Offensive Speech, and Public
Discourse in America, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1135, 1138 (1994) (describing
fighting words as "a category of expression historically unprotected by the First
Amendment").
6. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (emphasis added).
7. Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 212 (3d Cir. 2003).
8. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
9. For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
observed in 2008:
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University President Rodney Smolla observes, there now is a
"strong body of law expressly limiting the fighting words doctrine
to face-to-face confrontations likely to provoke immediate
violence."" Put differently, the fact that words may offend and
inflict emotional discomfort, standing alone, is not sufficient to
render them fighting words;" rather, as Professor Thomas Place
writes, "the only justification for prohibiting offensive speech is
the danger of an immediate violent response where words are used
in a face-to-face confrontation."l 2
The surviving second aspect of the test - words that "tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace"" - still endures, but it too
has been cabined and confined by later high court rulings. In
particular, Professor Michael Mannheimer notes that in several
cases during the 1970s, the Supreme Court clarified "the doctrine
as a narrowly-tailored device designed to address the problem of
Although the "inflict-injury" alternative in Chaplinsky's
definition of fighting words has never been expressly
overruled, the Supreme Court has never held that the
government may, consistent with the First Amendment,
regulate or punish speech that causes emotional injury but
does not have a tendency to provoke an immediate breach of
the peace.
Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 624 (7th Cir. 2008). It added that "whatever
vitality it may have had when Chaplinsky was announced, the 'inflict-injury'
subset of the fighting-words definition has never stood on its own." Id. at 625.
10. Rodney A. Smolla, Words "Which By Their Very Utterance Inflict
Injury ": The Evolving Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free
Speech Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 317, 350 (2009).
11. Cf Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (opining that "[t]he
hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow 'free trade in ideas' - even
ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or
discomforting"); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (observing that "if
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable"); Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576, 592 (1969) ("It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public
expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are
themselves offensive to some of their hearers.").
12. Thomas M. Place, Offensive Speech and the Pennsylvania Disorderly
Conduct Statute, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REv. 47, 55 (2002).
13. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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responsive violence by the recipient of insulting language."l 4 For
instance, in Cohen v. Cahfornia, it described fighting words as
"those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the
ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently
likely to provoke violent reaction."" The Court added in Cohen
that fighting words encompass only speech amounting to "a direct
personal insult."'" In NAACP v. ClaiborneHardware Co., the high
court concisely defined fighting words as "those that provoke
immediate violence." 7
Thus, to constitute fighting words today, the speech must be,
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has observed, "directed at a particular
person."" For example, the late Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. wrote,
fighting words are those "addressed by one citizen to another,face
to face and in a hostile manner." 9 In a nutshell, the limits on
fighting words center on four core elements:
* Content of Speech: Per Cohen, the substance of the speech
must consist of personally abusive epithets and insults;20
* Target of Speech: The speech must be directed at a specific
individual located in such close geographic proximity to the
speaker as to create a face-to-face confrontation;2'
* Likelihood of Reaction to Speech: Retaliation by the target of

14. Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L.
REv. 1527, 1528 (1993).
15. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
16. Id.
17. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982).
18. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
817 (1st ed. 1997).
19. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 408 U.S. 913, 913 (1972) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
20. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
21. See Citizen Publ'g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 113 (Ariz. 2005)
(observing that "the fighting words doctrine has generally been limited to 'faceto-face' interactions") (emphasis added); Idaho v. Poe, 88 P.3d 704, 714 (Idaho
2004) (observing that fighting words must be "spoken face-to-face") (emphasis
added).
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5
22

and

* Imminence of Reaction to Speech: There must be a
"likelihood that the person addressed [will] make an immediate
violent response."23
Distilled to their most basic layperson level, then, fighting words
are ones that are "likely to cause an average addressee to fight." 24
This article, using the September 2010 opinion by the Nebraska
25
as an analytical
Supreme Court in Nebraska v. Drahota
springboard, examines the viability of the aging fighting words
doctrine in the digital era. In particular, it analyzes whether the
doctrine can serve as a legal tool for censoring and/or punishing
personally abusive speech that is conveyed in targeted, one-on-one
fashion via text messages,26 instant messages 27 and e-mail
transmissions. Drahota centered on the question of whether
several e-mails "laced with provocative and insulting rhetoric"2 8
that were sent by a college student to a former professor who was
For
running for public office constituted fighting words. 29
instance, one e-mail provided, in relevant part:

22. See Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1293,
1314 (2007) (describing both "likelihood" and "imminence" as aspects of
fighting words).
23. Cf Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (emphasis added).
24. Ross v. Texas, 802 S.W.2d 308, 315 (Tex. App. 1990).
25. 788 N.W.2d 796 (Neb. 2010).
26. See Wendy Ceccucci et al., An Empirical Study of Behavioral Factors
Influencing Text Messaging Intention, 21 J. INFO. TECH. MGMT. 16, 16 (2010)
("Text messaging, also known as 'texting,' refers to the exchange of brief
messages, typically between 140 - 160 characters, sent between mobile phones
over cellular networks. The term also refers to messages sent using Short
Message Service (SMS).").
27. See Amanda O'Connor, Instant Messaging: Friend or Foe of Student
Writing?, 11 NEW HORIZONs ONLINE J. (2005) ("Instant messaging is a form of
computer 'chat' that allows one to have a real time, typed 'conversation' with
one or more 'buddies' while connected to the Internet.

. .

. It is an extremely

fast-growing communications medium, especially among adolescents").
28. Drahota, 788 N.W.2d at 798.
29. Id. at 798-799.
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Fuck you! You don't know me one bit. You are a
liberal American coward. If it were up to you, you
would imprison Bush before bin Laden because you
have such a fascination with it. I am tired of your
brainwashing students who are in the process of
I spent 18 months in
molding their minds.
Pensacola Florida before I was honorably
discharged for a neck injury. You can go fuck
yourself if you are going to get that way. I'd kick
your ass had you said that right in front of me, but
YOU don't have the guts to say that."
Whether such tech-conveyed speech falls within the unprotected
category of fighting words is important because, as Professor
Heidi Kitrosser notes, legislative bodies may pass laws to punish
the use of fighting words. 31 Although the Nebraska Supreme Court
ultimately found that the e-mails sent by Darren Drahota did not
constitute fighting words,32 the Court did not slam the door shut on
the possibility that one-on-one e-mail correspondence might
amount to fighting words under a different set of facts and
circumstances.
Instead, it chose to protect Drahota's speech because: (1) the
speech was political and, in particular, was directed not merely at a
professor, but at a professor running for public office;3 3 (2) the
speech was part of an ongoing correspondence between Drahota
and his professor, William Avery, in which no trouble had
30. Id. at 799.
31. Heidi Kitrosser, Containing Unprotected Speech, 57 FLA. L. REv. 843,
845 (2005).
32. Drahota, 788 N.W.2d at 805 (concluding that while "Drahota is not a
wordsmith, and his bumper sticker rhetoric was certainly provocative," his emails "did not rise to the level of fighting words under these facts. If the First
Amendment protects anything, it protects political speech and the right to
disagree").
33. For instance, the Nebraska high court focused on the fact that "the
context of Drahota's speech was an ongoing political debate." Id. at 803. It
added that "the First Amendment encourages robust political debate." Id. at
804. The court emphasized the point that "[b]y the time Drahota sent the emails at issue, Avery was running for office." Id.
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previously erupted;3 4 and (3) "even if a fact finder could conclude
that in a face-to-face confrontation, Drahota's speech would have
provoked an immediate retaliation, Avery could not have
immediately retaliated. Avery did not know who sent the e-mails,
let alone where to find the author."35 In summary, rather than
simply concluding that an e-mail message can never constitute
fighting words and end its inquiry without any further examination
of the facts of the case, the Nebraska Supreme Court performed a
detailed analysis involving the application of the law to the
specific and unique facts of the case.
As of early December 2010, not a single court-be it federal or
state-had squarely addressed the issue of whether texting
personally abusive messages might, under the right circumstances,
constitute fighting words. 36 The question of whether one-on-one
electronic correspondence like text messages can ever amount to
fighting words is particularly timely today because of the increased
dangers, including threat of suicide, posed to minors by cyberbullying." As one newspaper reported in October 2010, there has
been "a rash of teen suicides across the country as a result of
cyber-bullying."" The Pew Internet & American Life Project in
2007 released the results of a nationally representative phone
34. The Nebraska Supreme Court wrote that "Drahota and Avery had
corresponded for months on political issues. And both had made provocative
statements during that dialog without incident." Id. at 804.
35. Id.
36. That is, no on-point published opinions were available.
37. See, e.g., Katie Leslie, School Confronts Online Bullying, ATLANTA J.CONsT., Oct. 22, 2010, at lA (describing cyber-bullying as "the least physical
and nonconfrontational but perhaps the most public way to humiliate and
intimidate others," and noting that "cyber-bullying, or using social media Web
sites or text messaging to degrade others, has received national attention after
instances of young people who were victims of the harassment committing
suicide").
While there is no agreed-upon spelling for the term - variants include cyber
bullying, cyberbullying and cyber-bullying - this article adopts the spelling
"cyber-bullying," except when the article is quoting from other sources, in
which case the spelling employed by those sources is used as-is and remains
unaltered.
38. Tiffani N. Garlic, Father Pleads for Action Against Bullies, STARLEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 17, 2010, at 36.
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survey of 935 teenagers indicating the pervasiveness of the
problem of cyber-bullying:
Girls are more likely than boys to say that they have
ever experienced cyberbullying - 38% of online
girls report being bullied, compared with 26% of
online boys. Older girls in particular are more
likely to report being bullied than any other age and
gender group, with 41% of online girls ages 15 to
17 reporting these experiences. Teens who use
social network sites like MySpace and Facebook
and teens who use the [I]nternet daily are also more
likely to say that they have been cyberbullied.3 9
The federal government in October 2010 "issued guidance to
support educators in combating bullying in schools by clarifying
when student bullying may violate federal education antidiscrimination laws."40 At the same time, in an attempt to "build
upon efforts led by the U.S. Department of Education and other
federal agencies to spark a dialogue on the ways in which
communities can come together to prevent bullying and
harassment," 4 1 the White House announced it would "host a
conference to raise awareness and equip young people, parents,
educators, coaches and other community leaders with tools to
prevent bullying and harassment."42 Furthermore, Congress in
2010 considered the Safe Schools Improvement Act of 20103 in
order to address school-based bullying, which the measure defined
as "conduct that adversely affects the ability of one or more
39.

AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, DATA
MEMO: CYBERBULLYING AND ONLINE TEENS 2 (2007) http://www.pew

intemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2007/PIP%20Cyberbullying%2OMemo.pdf.
pdf.
40. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Education, Guidance Targeting Harassment
Outlines Local and Federal Responsibility (Oct. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/guidance-targeting-harassment-outlineslocal-and-federal-responsibility (last visited Dec. 13, 2010).
4 1. Id.
42. Id.
43. S. 3739, 111th Cong. (2010).
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students to participate in or benefit from the school's educational
programs or activities by placing the student (or students) in
reasonable fear of physical harm."" Another federal bill proposed
in 2010 specifically targeted cyber-bullying in schools and defined
it as bullying "that is undertaken, in whole or in part, through use
of technology or electronic communications (including electronic
mail, internet communications, instant messages, or facsimile
communications) to transmit images, text, sounds, or other data."4 5
The federal government defines cyber-bullying as:
any type of harassment or bullying (i.e., teasing,
telling lies, making fun of someone, making rude or
mean comments, spreading rumors, or making
threatening or aggressive comments) that occurs
through e-mail, a chat room, instant messaging, a
website (including blogs), text messaging, videos,
or pictures posted on websites or sent through cell
phones.4 6
With bullying and its digital-age sidekick, cyber-bullying, firmly
lodged in the cross-hairs of the federal government,47 state and
local legislative bodies,4 8 and the news media in late 2010,49 it is a
44. Id.
45. H.R. 5184, 111th Cong. (2010).
46. Electronic Aggression/Cyberbullying, FindYouthlnfo.gov, http://www.
findyouthinfo.gov/spotlight.cyberBullying.shtml (last visited Dec. 13, 2010).
FindYouthlnfo.gov is an government working group that was "created by the
Interagency Working Group on Youth Programs (IWGYP), which is composed
of representatives from 12 Federal agencies that support programs and services
focusing on youth." About the Working Group, FindYouthlnfo.gov,
http://www.findyouthinfo.gov/about.shtml (last visited Dec. 13, 2010).
47. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Carol Demare, Budget, Cyber Law Get Airing, TIMES-UNION
(Albany, N.Y.), Oct. 13, 2010, at B9 (describing a cyber-bullying law proposed
in Albany County, New York); Susan K. Livio, A New Weapon Against Bullies;
After Past Efforts Fall Short, Jersey Lawmakers Unveil Toughest Bill in the U.S.
And Assure Victims: We Have Your Back, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct.
26, 2010, at 1 (describing a bill introduced in the New Jersey Assembly known
as the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights); Ericka Mellon, Texas Eyes Anti-Bullying
Laws, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 11, 2010, at BI (describing efforts in the Texas
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propitious moment to examine whether the fighting words doctrine
- either in its current form or in a modified one that adapts it to the
changing modes of digital communication popular among minors
- provides a mechanism for targeting and punishing the electronic
speech of cyber bullies.
Such electronic speech is a favored mode of bullying
communication among minors today. For example, Boston
College Law School Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea observed in
a recent article that "rather than harass their classmates in the
locker room, hallways, and bathrooms, students engage in
'electronic aggression,' often in the form of malicious rumors or
humiliating or threatening speech spread on social networking
sites, e-mails, instant messages, chat rooms, text messages, and
blogs.""
It is the above-mentioned italicized forms of communicationone-to-one, real-time electronic messages between minors-in
Professor Papandrea's statement that are the specific modes of
expression examined in this article. Conversely, this article does
not address messages posted to either the general public or to

legislature to address bullying and cyber-bullying).
49. For instance, in October 2010 alone, the topic of cyber-bullying was
covered in articles and editorials by major newspapers across the United States.
See, e.g., Editorial, Fighting the Bullies, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, at A10
(opining that "the behavior of the bullies . . . must be addressed and that
"[p]eople from different cultures, backgrounds and religions are not always
going to like one another. But bullies must be taught two lessons: that the pain
their victims feel can be life-threatening, and that their actions will not be
tolerated"); Pamela Paul, The PlaygroundGets Even Tougher, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
10, 2010, at Section ST, 12 (addressing the topic of bullying and noting that "at
a time when teenage cyber-bullying is making headlines, parents fear that the
onset of bullying behavior is trickling down. According to a new Harris survey
of 1,144 parents nationwide, 67 percent of parents of 3- to 7-year-olds worry
that their children will be bullied"); Julie Pfitzinger, How to Stop Bullies;
HarassingBehavior Goes Beyond the Myth, STAR TIUB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 24,
2010, at 2E (addressing bullying and cyber bullying within the context of the
Minneapolis Public Schools); John Schwartz, Bullying, Suicide, Punishment,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, at Section WK 1 (addressing the question, "What
should the punishment be for acts like cyberbullying and online humiliation?").
50. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the DigitalAge, 60 FLA.
L. REv. 1027, 1037 (2008) (emphasis added).
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selected friends/subscribers on websites, such as posts on
Facebook walls and Twitter feeds.
Furthermore, this article concentrates exclusively on the fighting
words doctrine, not on two other distinct categories of unprotected
speech that also focus on potential acts of violence - true threats"
and incitement to violence.52 Discussion of these other two
categories of speech easily could constitute an entirely separate
law journal article.
Finally, this article centers on the extension of the fighting
words doctrine to cyber-bullying between minors in off-campus,
Because when cyber-bullying
Why?
non-school settings.
transpires on campus (two students, for instance, who are texting
or instant messaging each other in the school cafeteria or in a
classroom), school administrators need not reach for the fighting
words doctrine in order to punish the protagonists. Instead, they
need only turn to the United States Supreme Court's four-decadeold precedent in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District.53 Although some courts have attempted to stretch
51. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (observing that "the First
Amendment also permits a State to ban a 'true threat"' and defining true threats
as "statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals").
52. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that "the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action").
53. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In its seminal student-speech ruling in Tinker, the
high court protected the right of public school students in Iowa to wear black
armbands to school as a form of protest against the war in Vietnam and as a call
for a truce in that conflict. The Court in Tinker held that schools may censor
such student displays of political expression only when there is actual evidence
the speech in question "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Id. at 513. The Court added, in
language highly favorable to student speech rights, that the government "must
be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire
to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint." Id. at 509. Similarly, it noted that an "undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to
freedom of expression." Id. at 508. Ultimately, the Court in Tinker concluded
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Tinker to apply to the off-campus, online speech of their students,54
the United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on such a case
involving on-campus punishment under Tinker based upon offcampus, technology-conveyed speech that targets a student.
Part I of this article thus begins by providing a brief overview of
the growing problem of cyber-bullying, exploring both the
definitional difficulties in explicating cyber-bullying and the harms
that minors purportedly sustain and suffer at the hands of cyberbullies. In addition, Part I examines the First Amendment issues
raised by the censorship and punishment of cyber-bullying and
how courts confronted those issues in several very recent cases.
Next, Part II addresses typical and traditional instances of
fighting words, providing examples of the types of personally
abusive epithets that may trigger the application of the doctrine.
Furthermore, Part II highlights the judiciary's growing recognition
of and concern about harms caused to minors by abusive epithets
targeting gay, lesbian and transgendered students. Finally, Part II
also creates and teases out several cyber-bullying scenarios that are
fodder for fighting words analysis - scenarios that constitute
neither true threats nor incitements to violence, but that
that "the record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably have led
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference
with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises
in fact occurred." Id. at 514.
54. As one federal court recently observed, "student off-campus speech,
though generally protected, could be subject to analysis under the Tinker
standard as well if the speech raises on-campus concerns." Evans v. Bayer, 684
F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2010). See generally Clay Calvert, Tinker's
Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressedbut Still Standing, 58 AM. U. L. REV.
1167, 1175 (2009) (observing that "some lower courts are now using misusing, really - Tinker in a situation and scenario that the Court in 1969 could
hardly have imagined. In particular, they are incorrectly applying it to censor
off-campus student expression that is posted on the World Wide Web").
55. See Clay Calvert, Qualified Immunity and the Trials and Tribulations of
Online Student Speech: A Review of Cases and Controversiesfrom 2009, 8
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 86, 108 (2009) (describing "the profound muddle that is
the body of jurisprudence surrounding the free speech rights of public school
students in cyberspace," and arguing that "it is time for the Supreme Court to
enter into the fray to resolve the confusion and to bring uniformity so that both
students and principals know the legal boundaries").
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nonetheless use the type of "personally abusive epithets"" kids
engage in today to pick on minorities, gays and other groups.
Considering such scenarios is important because they illustrate the
possible real-world application of the fighting words doctrine,
rather than rendering this article a mere theoretical, academic
exercise.
Part III returns to the fighting words doctrine and examines its
possible application to punish cyber bullies, including the hurdles
that likely would plague the doctrine's deployment in this area. In
particular, two critical issues are addressed. First, must the
fighting words doctrine be confined to in-person, face-to-face
spoken communications; or can it be expanded to encompass oneon-one, real-time electronic communications, such as personally
abusive text messages, where the sender and recipient are in
relative geographic proximity to each other - the same athletic
field, the same movie theatre or the same shopping mall, for
instance - such that physical retaliation by the message recipient
could occur in face-to-face fashion in a matter of only a very few
minutes after receipt of the message? Second, would the United
States Supreme Court, after its 2010 decision in the crush-video"
case of United States v. Stevens," even be amenable to modifying
a category of historically unprotected expression - namely,
fighting words - to expand its reach to a new mode of
communication (texting and e-mails) with which it historically has
never dealt?
Finally, Part IV concludes by arguing that a carefully crafted
and narrow expansion of the fighting words doctrine may be
successful in targeting some instances of cyber bullying, but it
could well have the unintended, negative consequence of
squelching other forms of expression worthy of Constitutional
protection.

56. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
57. These are "are fetish videos in which small animals are taunted, tortured,
then crushed to death under the feet of provocatively dressed women." People
v. Thomason, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1064, 1065 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
58. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
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I. FROM BULLYING TO CYBER-BULLYING: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
PROBLEM AND How COURTS ARE STARTING To ADDRESS IT
This part has two sections, the first of which provides an

overview of the problems of both bullying and cyber-bullying,
including the harms caused by each and the definitional difficulties
in defining the concepts. The second section concentrates on how
courts are beginning to address cyber-bullying and the First
Amendment issues it raises.
A. Bullying and Cyber-Bullying: Definitions and Harms
Bullies have been an undesired element of adolescent life for
generations." As Barbara Coloroso, an expert on the topic, 60
recently observed, "almost all of us have been on the receiving end
of some sort of bullying.""

In the past, however, being a bully's victim often ended upon a
minor's egress through the proverbial schoolhouse gates and
entrance through his home's doorway.62 Parents today may look
back at those pre-Internet and pre-cell phone days and wish the
same space and time constraints on bullying were true for their
59. IAN RIVERS ET AL., BULLYING: A HANDBOOK FOR EDUCATORS AND

PARENTS 3 (2007) (describing the past being "littered" with bullying references,
and noting that until the early 1970s, bullying was "viewed as being nothing
more than one part of the fabric of human development - a rite of passage for
those that survived, and a mark of shame for those who did not escape
undamaged").
60. See Barbara
Coloroso Biography, Kids Are
Worth
It!,
http://www.kidsareworthit.com/Barbara s_Biography.html (last visited Dec. 13,
2010) (providing a brief biography of Coloroso and noting that she is "an
international bestselling author and for the past 38 years an internationally
recognized speaker and consultant on parenting, teaching, school discipline,
positive school climate, bullying, grieving, nonviolent conflict resolution and
restorative justice").
61.

BARBARA COLOROSO, THE BULLY, THE BULLIED, AND THE BYSTANDER

45 (1st ed. 2003).
62. Robert Slonje & Peter Smith, Cyberbullying: Another Main Type of
Bullying?, 49 SCANDANAVIAN J. PSYCHOL. 147, 148 (2008) (stating that cyber-

bullying is different from traditional bullying because cyber-bullying follows
the victim home).
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own children, who cannot so easily evade bullies in a world of
smart phones, texts and instant messages.63
The rise of the Internet, coupled with the ubiquitous
development and deployment of multiple modes of real-time
electronic communication technologies, unfortunately, threatens
adolescents with the potential for perpetual harassment in the
perceived security of their homes.64 Bullying can occur at multiple
times of day and in myriad places. One study, for instance,
examined the frequency of bullying by surveying more than 1,000
students at fourteen schools in nine cities across four states." The
results indicated a difference between intermittent victims of
bullying (thirty-three percent of students surveyed) and repeat
victims (more than 48.5 percent of students studied).66 Only 18.4
percent of those surveyed reported no bullying at all over the
course of the study."
A 2007 Pew Internet & American Life study examined cyberbullying and found that:
About one third (32%) of all teenagers who use the
internet say they have been targets of a range of
annoying and potentially menacing online
63. See Stacy M. Chaffin, Note & Comment, The New PlaygroundBullies of
Cyberspace: Online Peer Sexual Harassment, 51 How. L.J. 773, 773 (2008)
(writing that "today, kids are not able to escape the schoolyard bullies by
running to the comfort of their own homes. Now, the bullies follow them home
and start the real harassment online. A new wave of bullies - cyberbullies have found their niche in the playgrounds of cyberspace").
64. Carter Hay et al., TraditionalBullying, Cyber Bullying, and Deviance: A
General Strain Theory Approach, 26 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 130, 134 (2010)
(describing cyber-bullying to be a "reason for concern because, unlike face-toface bullying, cyber bullying may be especially difficult to escape from").
65. Finn-Aage Esbensen & Dena C. Carson, Consequences ofBeing Bullied:
Results From a LongitudinalAssessment ofBullying Victimization in a Multisite
Sample ofAmerican Students, 41 YOUTH & Soc'Y 209, 215 (2009).
66. Id. at 221. Intermittent victims are "those who reported one or more
instances of being bullied during only one data collection period or those who
were bullied once during at least two separate reporting periods," while repeat
victims are "those who were bullied two or more times during two or three
reporting periods." Id. at 218.
67. Id. at 221.
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activities-such as receiving threatening messages;
having their private emails or text messages
forwarded without consent; having an embarrassing
picture posted without permission; or having
rumors about them spread online."
No longer can harassed individuals find refuge in their homes
because they now can be reached at all times of the day via
electronic communication.69
What is bullying? There is no single, agreed-upon definition."
A 2010 study in the journal Educational Research observes,
however, that:
[t]here are common features in definitions used,
such as the intention to cause distress to another
pupil; it tends to be carried out by one or more
pupil; it occurs repeatedly over time; and there is an
imbalance of power between the perpetrator and the
victim ... but there is no universally accepted set of
features as to what constitutes bullying."
Dr. Tonja Nansel of the National Institute of Child Health and
68. Amanda Lenhart, Mean Teens Online: Forget Sticks and Stones, They've
Got Mail, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, June 27, 2007, available
at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/527/cyber-bullying.
69. See Cyberbully Tactics are Focus of State Law, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., July
1, 2010, at 1A ("Bullies have always been around. But they've changed their
scare tactics since the growth of electronic technology. Now they spread their
hostility with computers and cell phones") available at http://www.lvrj.
com/news/cyberbully-tactics-are-focus-of-state-law-97566509.html (last visited
Dec. 13, 2010).
70. Marilyn Langevin, Helping Children Deal With Teasing and Bullying:
For Parents, Teachers and Other Adults, Int'l Stuttering Assoc.,
http://www.stutterisa.org/CDRomProject/teasing/tease-bully.html (last visited
Dec. 13, 2010) (writing that "[d]efinitions of bullying vary. At present there is
not an agreed-upon definition and there are differences in how the term is
used").
71. Rachel E. Maunder et al., Pupil and Staff Perceptions of Bullying in
Secondary Schools: Comparing Behavioural Definitions and Their Perceived
Seriousness, 52 EDUC. RES. 263, 264 (2010).
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Human Development defines bullying as "a specific type of
aggression in which (1) the behavior is intended to harm or
disturb, (2) the behavior occurs repeatedly over time, and (3) there
is an imbalance of power, with a more powerful person or group
attacking a less powerful one."72 There are three possible modes
of bullying: verbal, physical, and relational."
While the meaning of the first two types seems obvious (words
and action), the concept of relational bullying refers to "the
systematic diminishment of a bullied child's sense of self through
ignoring, isolating, excluding, or shunning." 74 The harms from
such bullying are multiple: victims may experience loss of selfesteem, lack of desire to go to school, decrease in grades, and
behavioral and emotional changes, such as depression and
posttraumatic stress disorder." In addition, one study of middleschool students found that victims were "more likely to report
having difficulty making friends and having poor interactions with
With the advent of new communication
classmates.""
technologies, bullying is being transformed by a tech-savvy
generation of teenagers."
In particular, so-called cyber-bullying is both a relatively new,
technology-fueled phenomenon" and, apparently, an under72. Tonja Nansel et al., Bullying Behaviors Among US Youth: Prevalence
and Association with Psychosocial Adjustment, 285 JAMA 2094 (Apr. 25,
2001), available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/285/16/2094.full.pdf+html
(defining bullying).
73. COLOROSO, supra note 61, at 14.
74. Id. at 17.
75. Id. at 130-139.
76. RIVERS, supra note 59, at 5.
77. As Professor Mary Sue Backus writes:
Whether viewed as an acceptable rite of passage or as a social
ill worthy of substantial intervention on the part of parents,
educators, and legislators, bullying has been a part of growing
up for generations. It should come as no surprise, then, that
today's technologically savvy youth engage in bullying
behaviors through the same technology they use to interact
with each other and the world.
Mary Sue Backus, 0MG! Missing the Teachable Moment and Undermining the
Future of the FirstAmendment - TISNF!, 60 CASE W. RES. 153, 155 (2009).
78. Qing Li, Cyberbullying in Schools: A Research of Gender Differences, 27
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reported problem." As the author of a recent book on the topic
observes, "teens are reluctant to tell adults-for fear of
overreaction, restriction from online activities, and possible
retaliation by the cyberbully."so
Just as with bullying, there is no agreed-upon definition of
cyber-bullying, although a few organizations and researchers have
fashioned working definitions. For instance, Professor Kimberly
Mason defines cyber-bullying as "an individual or a group
willfully using information and communication involving
electronic technologies to facilitate deliberate and repeated
harassment or threat to another individual or group by sending or
posting cruel text and/or graphics using technological means."'
She adds that "[c]yberbullying, like other forms of bullying, is
centered on the systematic abuse of power and control over
another individual that is perceived to be vulnerable and weaker . .
. and this imbalance of strength and power makes it difficult for
the person being bullied to defend him- or herself."8 2
by
developed
an organization
Stop Cyberbullying,
83
WiredSafety.org, limits its definition to the bullying of children
and adolescents, asserting that "[o]nce adults become involved, it
is plain and simple cyber-harassment or cyberstalking. Adult
cyber-harassment
or
cyberstalking
is
NEVER
called
SCH. PSYCHOL. INT'L 1, 2 (2006) (observing that "[c]yberbullying is a new
phenomenon resulting from the advance of new
communication technologies including the Internet, cell phones and Personal
Digital Assistants") (emphasis added).
79. Peter K. Smith et al., Cyberbullying: Its Nature and Impact in Secondary
School Pupils, 49 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 376, 382 (2008) (finding
that more than forty percent of students were not telling anyone and fewer than
twenty-five percent of the remaining told an adult).
80. NANCY WILLARD, CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERTHREATS: RESPONDING
TO THE CHALLENGE OF ONLINE SOCIAL AGGRESSION, THREATS, AND DISTRESS 1
(1st ed. 2007).
81. Kimberly L. Mason, Cyberbullying: A Preliminary Assessment for
School Personnel, 45 PSYCHOL. INSCH. 323, 323 (2008).
82. Id. (citations omitted).
83. An Overview of WiredSafety.org - who we are and what we do,
http://www.wiredsafety.org/information/overview.html
WIREDSAFETY.ORG,
(last visited Dec. 13, 2010) (identifying WiredSafety.org as the largest and
oldest online safety, education and help group in the world).
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cyberbullying."84 This author of this article, however, takes no
position on whether or not cyberbullying can involve an adult; it
focuses in Parts II and III on whether cyberbullying between
minors (rather than than between an adult and a minor) may
constitute fighting words.
A definition with more specificity is fashioned by another
researcher, who defines cyber-bullying as "an aggressive,
intentional act carried out by a group or individual, using
electronic forms of contact, repeatedly and over time against a
victim who cannot easily defend him or herself."" As a 2008
study published in CyberPsychology & Behavior points out, cyberbullying, like traditional bullying, "happens more than once, it
involves psychological violence, and it is intentional.""
Cyber-bullying occurs in multiple ways, and it can take place
both on and off-campus." For instance, one study of 150 middleschool and high-school students published in 2007 found that:
[a] majority of the female students indicated that
cyber bullying was a problem at their schools,
although male students were somewhat less likely
to agree that this was a problem. Students indicated
that the majority of the incidents occurred outside
of the school day, with the exception of cyber
bullying via text messaging. Students indicated that
they were unlikely to report cyber bullying to the
adults at school, as it frequently occurs via cellular
phone use, and it is against the school policy to
84. What
is
Cyberbullying, Exactly?,
STOP
CYBERBULLYING,
http://www.stopcyberbullying.org/what is cyberbullying-exactly.html
(last
visited Dec. 13, 2010) (providing that cyber-bullying occurs "when a child,
preteen or teen is tormented, threatened, harassed, humiliated, embarrassed or
otherwise targeted by another child, preteen or teen using the Internet,
interactive and digital technologies or mobile phones," and adding that cyberbullying must "have a minor on both sides, or at least have been instigated by a
minor against another minor").
85. Smith, supra note 79, at 376 (defining cyber-bullying).
86. Francine Dehue, Cyberbullying: Youngsters' Experiences and Parental
Perception, 11 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAV. 271, 217 (2008).
87. RIVERS, supra note 59, at 10.
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have cellular phones on during school hours."
These cyber-offenders go after their prey through various online
fora and their attacks can be posted anonymously or under a
pseudonym, as the National Crime Prevention Council asserts
those who cyber-bully do so by "[pretending] they are other people
online to trick others, [spreading] lies and rumors about victims,
[tricking] people into revealing personal information, [sending] or
[forwarding] mean text messages and [posting] pictures of victims
without their consent."8 9 Cyber-bully victims experience many of
the same effects felt by those that are bullied the traditional way.
However, the emotional effects may be more damaging to the
targets than traditional bullying for several reasons. In particular,
Nancy Willard writes:
A target of in-school bullying has the ability to
escape such bullying when at home. The same is
not true with cyberbullying. Cyberbullying can be
occurring 24/7, whenever a teen uses a
technological device - or even if the teen does not
use any device (as in the case where students create
a Web site defaming another student).90
Willard adds that "online communications can be extremely
vicious and cruel." 9 1 Furthermore, bullies may not realize the
extent of the damage they cause because the interaction is online
and the bully cannot witness in person how much they hurt their
Ultimately, "cyberbullying can cause serious
victims. 9 2
psychological harm, including depression, low self-esteem,

88. Patricia W. Agatston et al., Students'Perspectiveson Cyber Bullying, 41
J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH S59, S60 (2007) (emphasis added).
89. Cyberbullying, NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, http://www.

ncpc.org/newsroom/current-campaigns/cyberbullying
2010).

(last visited Dec.

13,

90. WILLARD, supra note 80, at 48.

9 1. Id.
92. Id. at 33 (explaining bullies may not be able to "understand the emotional
experiences of others").
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anxiety, alienation, and suicidal intentions."9 3
Indeed, sometimes those suicidal intentions lead to suicidal
actions. One high-profile victim of cyberbullying was Megan
Meier.94 In October 2006, thirteen-year-old Meier committed
suicide." The death captured national headlines when it was
revealed that Meier had been harassed online by an adult.96
In particular, a Missouri woman named Lori Drew, whose
daughter had a falling out with Meier, used the online social
network MySpace to pose as a teenage boy who initially sent
friendly messages to Meier that later turned menacing in tone.97
Using the pseudonym Josh Evans,9 8 Drew ultimately wrote to
Meier that "[t]his world would be a better place without you."99
The same day that she received that message Meier took her own
life.'" Her tragic actions are not surprising, as researchers at the
Cyberbullying Research Center at Florida Atlantic University have
93. Alison Virginia King, Note, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws:
Keeping the Online PlaygroundSafefor Both Teens andFree Speech, 63 VAND.
L. REV. 845, 851 (2010). See also Donna St. George, Cyber-Bullying Linked to
Spike in Depression, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2010, at A3 (reporting that "[w]ith
traditional bullying methods, depression levels were highest among both the
victim and what researchers call 'bully-victims,' youths who sometimes act as
bullies but are also sometimes victims. But with cyber-bullying, victims faced
significantly greater levels of depression than their attackers or students who
were both bully and victim").
94. See generally United Sates v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal.
2009) (providing the facts surrounding the cyber-bullying of Meier).
95. Id.
96. See Tamara Jones, A Deadly Web of Deceit; A Teen's Online 'Friend'
Proved False, and Cyber- Vigilantes are Avenging Her, WASH. POST, Jan. 10,
2008, at Style C01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/01/09/AR2008010903367.html.
97. Brian Stelter, Guilty Verdict in Cyberbullying Case Provokes Many
Questions Over Online Identity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, at A28, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/28/us/28intemet.html.
98. See Christine Olley, When Cyberbullying Kills: Suicide's Mom Warns of
Social-Networking Dangers, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, Apr. 24, 2009, at

Local 20 (writing that "Josh Evans seemed to be the perfect kid. His photo
showed brown, wavy hair, blue eyes and chiseled features. But Josh Evans
wasn't real. He was the invention of Lori Drew").
99. Jones, supra note 96, at COl.
100. Id.
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found that "cyberbullying victims were almost twice as likely to
have attempted suicide compared to youth who had not
experienced cyberbullying."' 0
Because of the negative consequences of cyber-bulling, states
now are engaging in concerted efforts to combat it. According to a
2010 survey conducted by the Cyberbullying Research Center,
forty-four states have laws and policies on bullying including
thirty states on electronic harassment, but only five have laws
including the term cyber-bullying.'0 2 Forty-two states, in turn,
require schools to have a policy on bullying, while seven states
criminalize such behavior."' Most states place the burden of bully
punishment on schools,' 04 but the lack of a precise legal definition
for cyber-bullying leaves each state to determine what constitutes
such bullying for itself, potentially excluding bullying between
adults and children.
B.

The Courts Begin to Weigh in on Cyber-Bullying

With about one-third of minors reportedly experiencing cyberbullying,o' it is not surprising that courts now are beginning to
confront cases involving this burgeoning phenomenon. In the case
of Megan Meier, Lori Drew initially was convicted of
misdemeanor charges under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act'06
but the
for violating MySpace's terms-of-service policy,'
101. Sameer Hinduja & Justin Patchin, Cyberbullying Research Summary:
Cyberbullying and Suicide, CYBERBULLYING

RESEARCH CENTER (2010),

http://www.cyberbullying.us/cyberbullying-and suicide-research-fact-sheet.
pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2010).
102. Sameer Hinduja & Justin Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws: A Brief
Review of State Cyberbullying Laws and Policies, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH

CENTER (July 2010), http://www.cyberbullying.us/Bullying-andCyberbullying
Laws_20100701.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2010).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2010).
107. See Editorial, Vague Cyberbullying Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 8, 2009, at
A24 (noting that "the jury acquitted Ms. Drew of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, but convicted her of accessing a computer without proper
authorization in violation of the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Her
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conviction was later reversed.'" In August 2009, U.S. District
Judge George H. Wu held that the portion of the Act under which
Drew was convicted gave too much discretion to law enforcement
and too little notice to people like Drew for it to be used against
them when they allegedly violate a website's terms of service.'o
The criminal case against Drew is not the only cyberbullying
dispute to be litigated. For instance, a California appellate court in
March 2010 affirmed a trial court's refusal to dismiss a civil
lawsuit for defamation" 0. and intentional infliction of emotional
distress"' filed on behalf of a Los Angeles-area high school
student who was the subject of posts on his own website by several
fellow students who made "derogatory comments about his
perceived sexual orientation and threaten[ed] him with bodily
harm."" 2 One such post stated:
I want to rip out your fucking heart and feed it to
you....

I've . . . wanted to kill you. If I ever see

you I'm. . . going to pound your head in with an ice
pick. Fuck you, you dick-riding penis lover. I hope

crime was, in essence, violating MySpace's terms of service"). Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/08/opinion/08tue2.html (last visited Dec. 13,
2010).
108. Rebecca Cathcart, Conviction is Tossed Out in MySpace Suicide Case,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/
03/us/03bully.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2010).
109. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 467.
110. See generally GENELLE BELMAS

& WAYNE

OVERBECK, MAJOR

PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA LAW: 2011 EDITION 117 - 180 (2011) (providing an
excellent overview of defamation law, including its two subsets, libel and
slander).
111. A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
typically "consists of four elements: (1) the defendant's conduct must be
intentional or reckless, (2) the conduct must be outrageous and intolerable, (3)
the defendant's conduct must cause the plaintiff emotional distress and (4) the
distress must be severe." Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress as a Cause of Action Against the Media, 5 CoMM. L. &
POL'Y 469, 476 (2000).

112. D.C. v. R.R., 182 Cal. App. 4th 1190, 1199 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010), rev.
denied, 2010 Cal. LEXIS 6052 (Cal. June 17, 2010).
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you burn in hell."'
The appellate court specifically considered the dangers posed by
cyber-bullying,ll 4 and it addressed the issue of whether the
statement quoted above would constitute a true threat of
violence."'
True threats of violence are one of the narrow
categories of expression not protected by the First Amendment.1 16
The appellate court did not, however, consider whether the
statements constituted fighting words. Nonetheless, it was "one of
the first [cases] in California to examine the boundaries between
free expression and so-called cyber-bullying.""'
In May 2010, a federal district court in California addressed a
case involving a student, identified as J.C., who was suspended
from her public school after she posted a video on YouTube of her
friends talking in disparaging fashion about one of their
classmates."' The girl who took the video and later posted it was
suspended from school for two days."' She responded by suing
the school and certain administrators, claiming they "violated her
First Amendment rights by punishing her for making the YouTube
video and posting it on the Internet. J.C. argue[d] that the School
had no authority to discipline her because her conduct took place
entirely outside of school." 2 0 In considering the claim, U.S.
District Judge Stephen V. Wilson offered up what might be the
first concise judicial definition of cyber-bullying when he wrote:

113. Id.
114. Id. at 1218.
115. Id. at 1219-1226.
116. See supra note 51.
117. Bob Egelko, Threatening Posts Ruled Not Free Speech, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 17, 2010, at C2. Available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-03-17/bayarea/18835 111_l1free-speech-first-amendment-message (last visited Dec. 13,
2010).
118. J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D.
Cal. 2010). Among other things, the classmate that was verbally bullied on the
video was called a slut and described by one girl as "the ugliest piece of shit
I've ever seen in my whole life." Id. at 1098.
119. Id. at 1099.
120. Id. at 1100.
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The Court's ruling is limited to the issue of
whether, and under what circumstances, the School
can discipline a student for off-campus speech
within the bounds of the First Amendment.
Whether a student separately may be liable in tort
for defamatory, derogatory, or threatening
statements made about a classmate and published
over the Internet, often called "cyber-bullying," is

not at issue here. 12 1
While Judge Wilson dodged the issue of whether there is a
separate tort cause of action for cyber-bullying, a trial court judge
in New York in July 2010 squarely addressed and rejected such a
proposition.122 In particular, Judge Randy Sue Marber reasoned
that "the Courts of New York do not recognize cyber or Internet
bullying as a cognizable tort action. A review of the case law in
this jurisdiction has disclosed no case precedent which recognized
cyber bullying as a cognizable tort action."1 2 3
Courts facing cases involving cyber-bullying must confront
thorny First Amendment questions because, to the extent that
cyber-bullying necessarily involves a speech component - namely,
abusive words and insults - there are issues surrounding whether
that speech merits Constitutional protection or whether it crosses
the line into one of the unprotected categories of expression. 124
Indeed, minors who bully via technologically disseminated

121. Id. at 1122 n.15 (emphasis added). Judge Wilson ultimately held that
the case was governed by the United States Supreme Court's precedent from
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969), and that the school had violated the student's First Amendment rights
because "no reasonable jury could conclude that J.C.'s YouTube video caused a
substantial disruption to school activities, or that there was a reasonably
foreseeable risk of substantial disruption as a result of the YouTube video." Id.
at 1117.
122. Finkel v. Dauber, 906 N.Y.S.2d 697, 702-703 (N.Y. 2010).
123. Id. at 703.
124. This is illustrated by the cases of D.C. v. R.R., 182 Cal. App. 4th 1190
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010), and JC. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp.
2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010), described earlier in this section.
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messages generally do possess First Amendment speech rights.125
While cyber-bullying likely will not vanish without the combined
efforts of parents, educators and legislators, perhaps some battles
can be won in court by applying Chaplinsky's fighting words
doctrine as one means of redress. The next part of this article thus
turns its attention to fighting words scenarios involving minors.
II. FIGHTING WORDS, MINORS AND CYBER-BULLYING SCENARIOS
INVOLVING TEXTS AND INSTANT MESSAGES
This part also has two sections. First, Section A provides an
overview of the types of language that traditionally give rise to the
application of the fighting words doctrine, and the contexts in
which that language is used. Section B delves deeper to articulate
three hypothetical scenarios involving real-time, high-tech
communication between minors that may fall within the confines
of the fighting words doctrine were it to be expanded beyond mere
face-to-face communications.
A.

The Types ofEpithets and CircumstancesThat May Give Rise
To Application of the Fighting Words Doctrine

In determining whether a particular instance of speech
constitutes fighting words, two variables are critical: 1) the nature
of the words used; and 2) the factual circumstances and context in
which the words are used. 126 As one court put it, "[t]he 'fighting
125. Cf Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576
(7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001) (observing that "[c]hildren
have First Amendment rights"); Allen v. City of Bordentown, 524 A.2d 478,
484-485 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1987) (observing that "while the rights of
minors are not as extensive as those of adults," minors "are recognized as
'persons' under the Federal Constitution and thus possess certain fundamental
rights, "including freedom of speech," and adding that "children have
constitutional rights, including First Amendment rights").
126. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit observed
nearly thirty years ago, ". . . words are not inflammatory per se, without regard
to the circumstances in which they were uttered" and that "the circumstances
surrounding the words can be crucial." Lamar v. Banks, 684 F.2d 714, 719 (11th
Cir. 1982).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol21/iss1/2

26

Calvert: Fighting Words in the Era of Texts, IMs and E-Mails: Can a Dispar

2010]

FIGHTING WORDS

27

words' concept has two aspects. One involvesthe quality of the
words themselves. The other concerns the circumstances under
which the words are used."1 2 7 Simply put, any fighting words
formula requires: words + circumstances. 1 28
Keeping in mind the two-part relationship between words and
circumstances, this section initially examines some traditional
notions of, and scenarios involving, fighting words and then, more
specifically, examines fighting words when the target of the
speech is a minor. In particular, the following straightforward
quotation succinctly captures what is arguably the quintessential
fighting words scenario in the United States:
"No fact is more generally known than that a white man who
calls a black man a 'nigger' within his hearing will hurt and anger
the black man and often provoke him to confront the white man
129
and retaliate."
So wrote the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1997 in
finding that the use of the word "nigger" by one adult directed at
another adult amounted to "a classic case of the use of 'fighting
words' tending to incite an immediate breach of the peace which
are not protected by either the Constitution of the United States or
Indeed, the use of racial
the Constitution of North Carolina."'
slurs can constitute fighting words if they are directed at particular
individuals and when they are considered in conjunction with the
speaker's actions and proximity to the target of the speech. 3 1
Racial slurs that constitute fighting words also include the
derogatory utterance of "nigger" by a Caucasian minor directed at
127. Connecticut v. Hoskins, 401 A.2d 619, 621 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978).
128. See Maine v. John W., 418 A.2d 1097, 1106 (Me. 1980) (noting that
many courts "faced with the task of determining what constitutes fighting
words" employ objective tests that "focus on the context of the incident rather
than solely on the content of the words") (emphasis added).
129. In re Spivey, 480 S.E.2d 693, 699 (N.C. 1997) (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 699.
131. See, e.g., Wichita v. Hughes, 798 P.2d 972 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988)
(involving a defendant who "called various people 'nigger,' 'Communist spic,'
'moustached fag,' 'son of a bitch,' 'motherfucker,' and 'criminal cop"' at the
same time the defendant was "slamming of a metal rack down onto a counter
and the grabbing of a store customer by the shirt," and concluding the speech
constituted fighting words).

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

27

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2

DEPAUL J ART, TECH. &IP LAW

28

[Vol. XXI:1

an African-American minor under certain circumstances. 132
In addition to racial insults, sexually derogatory insults may
constitute fighting words. At least one appellate court, for
instance, has held that the use of the words "bitch" and "slut" by
an adult are "likely to cause an average addressee to fight"' 33 and
that those words can be expressed in a mode and manner
"calculated to bait another into a fight."' 34 Calling an adult female,
who identified herself as a Christian and a lesbian, terms such as
"Christian lesbo" and "lesbian for Jesus" has also been found to
constitute fighting words."'
Professor Timothy Jay, a psycholinguistics expert from the
132. The Supreme Court of North Dakota in 2010 found the use of the word
"nigger" and other similar terms by a minor, identified as H.K., in a one-on-one,
face-to-face encounter with an African-American minor, identified as T.L.,
"constituted 'fighting words' in the context in which they were uttered and the
protections of the First Amendment did not apply." In re H.K., 778 N.W.2d 764,
770 (N.D. 2010). The court reasoned:
H.K. did more than simply utter an offensive racial epithet.
The evidence established H.K. followed T.L. into the
bathroom at the teen center, yelled at her, repeatedly called
her a "nigger," and told her to "watch out" because she
"own[s] this town" and does not want "niggers" in it. Upon
consideration of the context in which she made these
statements, an objectively reasonableperson would find H.K.
used the term "nigger" in a derogatory manner that
heightened the potential her statements would incite a breach
of the peace or violent reaction, particularly when addressed
to an individual of African-American ancestry.
Id. (emphasis added).
Similarly, a New York appellate court ruled in 2008 that the speech of one
juvenile to another while riding a school bus constituted fighting words when
the speech included the phrase, "we shoot niggers like you in the woods." In re
Shane EE., 48 A.D.3d 946, 946 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). In addition to finding
that this speech constituted a true threat of violence, the appellate court
concluded that "the language at issue here is so personally and racially offensive
that it was 'likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause
a breach of the peace."' Id. at 947 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
US 568, 574 (1942)).
133. Griffith v. City of Bay St. Louis, 797 So. 2d 1037, 1041 (Miss. Ct. App.
2001).

134. Id.
135. Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 205-206 (3d Cir. 2005).
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Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts,'36 observes that words such
as "fuck off' and "motherfucker" produce a strong reaction from
males to fight, as do references that question masculinity and
sexual identity such as "pussy" and "faggot."'
Jay's research
finds that females would be likely to fight when words such as
"slut," "whore" and "cunt" are used because they "refer to sexual
looseness."'
Jay concludes that "although the fighting words
doctrine does not address the issue of gender differences, these
In other words, a distinction should be
differences do exist."'
made between whether the target of the speech is a male or a
female.
If this is the case, then a distinction might also be made whether
the target of the speech is an adult or a minor, with age-like
gender-affecting the propensity of person to respond with violence
to speech. When it comes to minors, personal insults that
constitute fighting words might well conceivably sweep up far
more than just racial insults like the word "nigger". One kid
calling another kid fat, for instance, might be enough to trigger a
fight.'40 Likewise, one minor calling another a "fag" or "queer"
136. Jay is "[a] world-renowned expert in cursing" who "is frequently sought
for his expertise on psycholinguistics." Dr. Timothy Jay, Professor, Psychology
Faculty, Massachusetts College of Liberal Arts, http://www.mcla.edu/
Undergraduate/majors/psychology/timothyjay (last visited Dec. 13, 2010).
137. TIMOTHY JAY, WHY WE CURSE: A NEURO-PSYCHO-SOCIAL THEORY OF
SPEECH 218 (1st ed. 2000).
138. Id.

139. Id.
140. For instance, after teenage singing sensation Miley Cyrus was derided
as "fat" by several people on the Internet, she responded with what the Toronto
Star described as "an angry tirade on her Twitter web page." She Ain't Heavy,
Just Really Annoyed, TORONTO STAR, May 20, 2009, at E2. In particular, then
sixteen-year-old songstress Cyrus wrote:
Talk all you want. I have my flaws. I'm a normal girl there's
things about my body I would change, but stop calling me f*t
in post. I don't even like the word. Those remarks that you
hateful people use are fighting words, the ones that scar
people and cause them to do damage to themselves or others.
Id. (emphasis added). Although Miley Cyrus has no credibility as a legal
scholar and is not using the term "fighting words" in a legal sense, her
observation that weight-based insults can be traumatizing to teens nonetheless is
indicative of the type of personal insult that might spark responsive violence in a
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might also constitute unprotected fighting words, as Judge Richard
Posner suggested in his recent majority opinion in Nuxoll v. Indian
4
' The plaintiff in Nuxoll, a high school
PrairieSchool District.1
sophomore, conceded that "he could not inscribe 'homosexuals go
to Hell' on his T-shirtbecause those are fighting words and so can
be prohibited despite their expressive content and arguable
theological support."' 4 2 Posner called this concession "prudent,"'4 3
adding that:
People are easily upset by comments about their
race, sex, etc., including their sexual orientation,
because for most people these are major
components of their personal identity - none more
so than a sexual orientation that deviates from the
norm. Such comments can strike a person at the
core of his being.

There is evidence, though it is suggestive rather
than conclusive, that adolescent students subjected
to derogatory comments about such characteristics
may find it even harder than usual to concentrate on
their studies and perform up to the school's
expectations. 144
Importantly for purposes of this article, Posner suggested a
possible two-level, age-based theory of fighting words when he
added that adults "can handle such remarks better than kids can
and [. . .] adult debates on social issues are more valuable than

debates among children."' 4 5 In brief, given different levels of
cognitive development, what might not rise to the level of a
fighting word for an adult might well do so when the speech is
one-on-one setting.
141. 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
142. Id. at 671.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 674.
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directed at a minor.
The judiciary is growing increasingly concerned by anti-gay
epithets directed by minors and the harms they may cause. For
instance, U.S. District Judge James Gritzner wrote in 2004 that
"the use of anti-gay epithets, homophobic comments, or other
forms of 'gay bashing' is a serious problem in our schools."14 6
Three years earlier, U.S. District Judge Donovan W. Frank
observed that:
The teenage years are a time of discovery as all of
our youth assert their individuality and sexuality.
Those students who identify themselves as gay,
lesbian, bisexual, or transgender ("GLBT"),
however, struggle with the added pressures of
potential alienation from friends, family, and
community, and the potential for ridicule or even
violence. Indeed, studies show that more than
ninety percent of high school students hear negative
comments regarding homosexuality during the
school day. It is no wonder that there are
significantly higher reports of depression and
suicide amongst our GLBT youth, a problem that
cannot be ignored.147
More recently, U.S. District Judge Richard Smoak in 2008 cited
a veritable laundry list of research publications when observing
that studies "confirm the vulnerability of gay and lesbian
students."l4 8 All of this provides support for adjusting the fighting
words doctrine to take into account the age of the target of speech,
as well as his or her sexual orientation.
Can insulting text messages lead to fights between the sender
and recipient when both are minors? The answer clearly is yes.

146. Doe v. Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist., 316 F. Supp. 2d 809, 815 n.2 (S.D. Iowa
2004).
147. Chambers v. Babbitt, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1073 (D. Minn. 2001)
(emphasis added).
148. Gillman v. Sch. Bd. Holmes County, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1370 (N.D.
Fla. 2008).
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As a November 2010 article in USA Today explained one such
incident, "Josie Lou Ratley, 15, suffered permanent brain damage
when he was beaten outside the school by a student from another
school who allegedly received a disparaging text message from
Ratley about his brother, who had committed suicide. Ratley, an
The
eighth-grader, was stomped with steel-toe boots."'4 9
individual who allegedly attacked Ratley, Wayne Treacy, was
charged with attempted murder.'
B.

Teens, Technology and Fighting Words: Some Scenarios That
a Modified Fighting Words Doctrine Might Address

Given the above background on fighting words, this section sets
forth three brief hypothetical scenarios involving one-on-one
mediated communications-either e-mails or texts-between minors.
The hypotheticals are used here simply to illustrate situations to
which the fighting words doctrine might be applied, were it to be
interpreted liberally by courts to sweep up not simply face-to-face
communications, but also texts and e-mails. The personally
abusive epithets used in the hypotheticals were specifically chosen
in light of the research about fighting words set forth in Section A
of this part of the article.
Significantly, in each of the following scenarios, the minors are
in close geographic proximity to each other such that a fight could
well result within less than five minutes of a message being
communicated to one of the parties. In addition, the author of this
article has attempted to carefully craft the content of the messages
in all three scenarios so as to fall outside the reach of the true
threats doctrine but within the ambit of the fighting words doctrine
as abusive, personal insults. As noted earlier, these are two
149. Jarrett Bell, Brown's Anti- Violence Plea; His Campaign Teaches Kids
Conflict Resolution, USA TODAY, Nov. 16, 2010, at IC. Available at
http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/sports/20101116/brown 16_cv.art.htm
(last visited Dec. 13, 2010).
150. Rafael A. Olmeda, Middle School Students Writing a Book about
Bullying, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), July 19, 2010.
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-07-18/news/fl-browardat
Available
bullying-book-20100718_1_anti-bullying-program-miami-dade-school-districtsdeerfield-beach-middle-school (last visited Dec. 13, 2010).
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distinct First Amendment doctrines,"' and while speech
constituting true threats and fighting words are sometimes
entangled such that both doctrines could apply to a single speech
episode or occurrence, this article concentrates on the latter
standard. Finally, all three situations involve real-time, electronic
communications between minors in decidedly off-campus, nonschool locations such that punishment of the speakers should not
fall within the purview of school administrators under the Tinker
standard.'5 2
1.

The Locker Room Episode

A local youth-league soccer team, comprised of minors ranging
from fourteen to sixteen years of age, is in the locker room
preparing for a game against a team from a neighboring
community. A rumor has floated around the team for several days
that one of its members, Greg, is gay. Biff, a teammate, starts
sending Greg text messages from across the locker room where
they are getting dressed, telling him "keep your hands off the
soccer balls; I know you've got a thing for balls." The texts,
which Biff sends about every minute or so for about ten minutes,
escalate into homophobic slurs - calling Greg "fag," "queer," and
a "bone-smoking cock sucker." About twenty seconds after
receiving a text that calls him a "pussy," Greg walks over about
fifteen yards to Biff's locker and tells him to stop texting. Biffjust
laughs, and Greg takes a swing at Biff, punching him in the face.
The coach calls the police and Greg is arrested for assault, but his
attorney argues that Biff's speech amounted to fighting words.
2.

The Movie Theater Eruption

In a shopping-mall movie theater, two fourteen-year-old girlsBrittany and Hayley-are using Research in Motion's Blackberry
Messenger, an instant messaging application for Blackberry smart151. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (referencing the true threats
doctrine as a distinct category of unprotected expression).
152. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (describing the authority
of school officials under Tinker to punish student expression).
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phone owners, to communicate with each other. Brittany, who is
sitting in the back row of the theater, is secretly forwarding the
conversation to other girls she knows who are also in the theater as
a joke on Hayley.
Brittany then starts making fun of Hayley, who is sitting ten
rows in front of Brittany, in their texting conversation for believing
that they are "bffs,"" and she tells Hayley "you are nobody
without me, you fat bitch." Brittany then adds, "btw, I've been
forwarding this to everyone, lesbo. Lol!" Just then the movie
ends, and Hayley quickly exits the theatre and waits in the lobby
for about thirty seconds for Brittany. As soon as Brittany enters
the lobby, Hayley slaps her in the face before Brittany even sees
her. Hayley is arrested for assault after movie personnel call the
police, but her parents argue that Brittany's speech amounted to
fighting words.
3.

The Shopping Mall Showdown

Jayson and Heath, two 15-year-old boys with a history of
animosity between them, are texting each other while both are
walking around the same shopping mall on a Saturday afternoon.
Although they are in different stores and about 100 yards away
from each other, Jayson and Heath both know they are somewhere
in the same mall because they saw each other being dropped off
their by their respective mothers. Jayson texts Heath, "Your
girlfriend is a skanky slut. She got high with me last night and we
fucked."
Heath quickly texts back, "Fuck off."
Jayson
immediately replies, "I'd rather fuck your girlfriend, douche bag."
Heath then sets off to find Jayson in the mall, and he locates
Jayson about three minutes later. Heath then punches Jayson in
the stomach. Heath is arrested by Blart, a mall cop, for battery, but
Heath asserts that Jayson's texts constituted fighting words.
The next part of this article considers whether the fighting words
doctrine could, indeed, be interpreted by courts in a manner that
would render unprotected by the First Amendment the expression
153. This stands for "best friends forever."
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=bff
2010).
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of Biff, Brittany and Jayson in each of these scenarios.
III. MODIFYING THE FIGHTING WORDS DOCTRINE TO ACCOUNT
FOR CYBER-BULLYING: IS SUCH AN APPROACH POSSIBLE AFTER
STEVENS?

In its 2010 ruling in United States v. Stevens,'54 the United States
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal statute criminalizing
the commercial creation, sale or possession of certain depictions of
animal cruelty.' In crafting its decision, the high-court majority
was unambiguous in its extreme disinclination to create and
designate new categories of unprotected expression simply
because the speech at issue supposedly-in the government's
opinion-is devoid of social value.156
In particular, Chief Justice John Roberts, writing the opinion of
the court for an eight-justice majority,' rejected the use of what
he called "a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage"'
that would hinge on little more than "an ad hoc balancing of
relative social costs and benefits"'" of the speech in question.
"When we have identified categories of speech as fully outside the
protection of the First Amendment, it has not been on the basis of
154. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2010) (providing that "[w]hoever knowingly
creates, sells, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of
placing that depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both," but
carving out an exception for "any depiction that has serious religious, political,
scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value").
156. Despite its absolutist language, the First Amendment does not protect
all expression. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002)
(writing that "as a general principle, the First Amendment bars the government
from dictating what we see or read or speak or hear. The freedom of speech has
its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including
defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real
children"). See supra note 4 (providing further elaboration on categories of
unprotected expression).
157. The lone dissenting justice was Samuel A. Alito, Jr. See Stevens, 130 S.
Ct. at 1592-1602 (Alito, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 1585.
159. Id.
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a simple cost-benefit analysis,"1 60 Roberts wrote. He openly
derided such a test as "highly manipulable," 16 ' explaining that the
Court lacks such "freewheeling authority to declare new categories
of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment."' 62
Fighting words, as described earlier, have long been recognized
by the Court as outside the scope of First Amendment. 163 yet
compared to the texting and messaging scenarios set forth in
Section B of Part II, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire64 -the decision
that gave rise to the fighting words exception-occurred in an inperson, face-to-face situation in which a Jehovah's Witness, while
standing on a public sidewalk, called the City Marshal of
Rochester, New York, "a God damned racketeer"' 5 and "a damned
Fascist."' 66 Not only was the speech of Walter Chaplinsky
communicated in a person-to-person manner, but the Supreme
Court emphasized that "the spoken, not the written, word is
involved."' 6
In fact, the Supreme Court's articulation of the
fighting words doctrine in Chaplinsky uses the term "utterance,"l68
further suggesting the doctrine was originally designed to apply
only to the spoken word.
The notion that the fighting words doctrine is cabined to inperson, spoken-word scenarios was reiterated by Justice Antonin
Scalia during oral argument in October 2010 in the Westboro
Baptist Church funeral-protest case of Snyder v. Phelps.6 9 As
Justice Scalia verbally volleyed with Margie J. Phelps, attorney for
the respondents, "My goodness. We - we did have a doctrine of
fighting words, and you acknowledge that if somebody said, you
know, things such as that to his face, that wouldn't be protected by
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 1586.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 2 - 5 and accompanying text.
315 U.S. 568 (1942).

165. Id. at 569.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 571.

168. Id. at 572.
169. Transcript of Oral Argument, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (Oct. 6,
2010), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument
transcripts/09-751.pdf (last visited Dec. 13, 2010).
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the First Amendment."'" Similarly, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
expressed her belief during oral argument in Snyder that the
fighting words doctrine is limited to situations in which "you say
that to me and I'm immediately going to punch you in the nose."' 7 1
The question that arises, when reading Chaplinsky through the
lens of Stevens and the oral-argument remarks of both Justices
Scalia and Ginsburg in Snyder, is this: Does the high court's stated
reluctance in Stevens to carving out new categories of unprotected
expression mean that it would be similarly averse to expressly
modifying Chaplinsky, allowing it to apply to modem-day modes
of one-on-one, real-time communication-namely, texting, instant
messaging, and e-mailing-that are favored by teens? 72 Parsed
differently, does an avowed reluctance to create new categories of
unprotected expression in Stevens translate to an equally stubborn
unwillingness to expand those categories of unguarded speech that
already exist?
Modifying and expanding the fighting words doctrine in order to
prevent harm to minors caused by cyber-bullying certainly seems,
at least at first glance, like an uphill battle because, if anything, the
Court has narrowed the fighting words doctrine over time, not
expanded it. Professor Jeffrey Shaman, for instance, writes that
"while the Court has never expressly overruled Chaplinsky nor
expressly recanted the fighting words doctrine, it has made a point
of confining the fighting words doctrine to a more narrow scope
170. Id. at 28 (emphasis added). Margie Phelps, the daughter of the
Westboro Baptist Church's leader, the Reverend Fred Phelps, actually expressed
her own displeasure with the fighting words doctrine later during oral argument
when she stated, "Well, Justice Scalia, I must hasten to say this: I am not a fan
of the fighting words doctrine. I do think it has problems. I just don't think it
applies in this case." Id. at 45.
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. As Professor Rich Ling of the IT University of Copenhagen recently
observed:
Teens and young adults have been a major force in the
development and use of texting. Indeed, in Norway as in
other locations, it was teens that first popularized the use of
text messages as a free way to communicate with their peers
in the latter part of the 1990s.
Rich Ling, Texting as a Life Phase Medium, 15 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED
COMM. 277, 277 (2010).
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and for many years has not used the fighting words doctrine to
uphold a regulation of speech."'" It thus would represent a
dramatic break from its past interpretation of the fighting words
doctrine were the Supreme Court to suddenly construe it broadly
in the context of cases involving one-on-one, real-time electronic
communication between minors.
Yet the Court in Stevens expressly stated that exceptions to the
blanket of First Amendment protection may be made when the
speech in question, such as child pornography, is intrinsically
related to the abuse of minors.'74 Although it is a slender reed
upon which to lean any expansion of the aging fighting words
document, it is somewhat encouraging that the Court focused on
harm to minors and a "proximate link"' between the speech and
the harm that minors suffer in its description in Stevens of when a
categorical carve-out is permissible. This will become significant
if courts focus only on expanding the fighting words exception
narrowly to cover cyber-bullying scenarios involving one-on-one
texting, instant messaging and e-mailing between minors, given
the harms discussed earlier in this article that are caused by
personally abusive epithets directed by bullies at minors. If the
judiciary is particularly concerned about harm to minors caused by
speech, and if in very recent cases such as Federal
Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.176 it
does not require direct proof of causation of harm to minors
purportedly wrought by speech, then this too would militate in
favor of an expansion of the fighting words doctrine to such oneon-one texting and instant-messaging scenarios between minors.1
173. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low- Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV.
297, 303 (1995).
174. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010).
175. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002)).
176. 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009).
177. In Fox Television Stations, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the majority
of the Court, in considering the Federal Communications Commission's efforts
to protect minors from broadcast indecency:
There are some propositions for which scant empirical
evidence can be marshaled, and the harmful effect of
broadcast profanity on children is one of them. One cannot
demand a multiyear controlled study, in which some children
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Despite such a mixed trajectory for modification and expansion,
the fighting words doctrine certainly can be-and actually has
been-tweaked to adapt to the particular characteristics of the target
of the speech (the person at whom the speech is directed). For
instance, courts have a recognized "a narrower application'"" of
the doctrine when the target of speech is a police officer.' 79 Why?
Because, as the Supreme Court has observed, "the First
Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and
challenge directed at police officers"'" because a properly trained
officer is expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than "the
average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to
'fighting words.""'
Under this line of logic, calling a police officer an "asshole"
typically is not enough to trigger the application of the fighting
words doctrine.' 82 Similarly, naming an officer a "son of a bitch"
does not fall within the scope of the fighting words exception to
free expression.'8 3 Furthermore, as U.S. District Judge James 0.
are intentionally exposed to indecent broadcasts (and insulated
from all other indecency), and others are shielded from all
indecency. .

.

. Here it suffices to know that children mimic

the behavior they observe - or at least the behavior that is
presented to them as normal and appropriate. Programming
replete with one-word indecent expletives will tend to produce
children who use (at least) one-word indecent expletives.
Id. at 1813 (emphasis added).
178. Haynes v. San Francisco, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76829, *19 (N.D. Cal.
July 28, 2010).
179. Id. See Gold v. City of Miami, 138 F.3d 886, 888-889 (11th Cir. 1998)
(reasoning that "the fighting words doctrine has a narrower application where,
as here, an individual's speech offends a police officer").
180. Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987).
181. Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
182. See Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 895 (6th Cir. 2002) (involving a
case in which a man claimed he was arrested without probable cause and in
retaliation for his having insulted a police officer, and concluding that "Mr.
Greene's characterization of Lt. Barber as an 'asshole' was not egregious
enough to trigger application of the 'fighting words' doctrine"); Buffkins v. City
of Omaha, 922 F.2d 465, 472 (8th Cir. 1990) (calling an arresting officer an
"asshole" was protected speech), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 898 (1991).
183. Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 213 n.10 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Browning held in 2006, "the phrase 'fuck you' by itself does not
rise to fighting words when directed at a police officer, even in a
crowded mall." 8 4 The bottom line of these "contempt of cop"'85
cases, despite a few outlier opinions,186 is that:
a shift in the intended audience of speech - in other
words, a shift in the target at whom speech is
directed - will affect the extent of protection that
speech receives, at least within the framework of
the fighting words doctrine as it has evolved since
Chaplinsky. Placed in the context of a simple "ifthen" formula: If the audience or target of the
speech is the average citizen, then the speech
receives less protection than if the target is the
police. *
What is more, while one teenager giving the middle-finger
gesture to another teenager might well constitute fighting words,"'
184. Stone v. Juarez, No. CIV 05-508 JB/RLP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27272, at *35 (D.N.M. Apr. 23, 2006).
185. William Cohen, A Look Back At Cohen v. California,34 UCLA L. REV.
1595, 1605 (1987).
186. See, e.g., Delaware v. Field, 1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 316, at *4 (Aug.
15, 1990) (concluding that "calling a law enforcement officer a vulgar name is
not protected speech. The only purpose of such an act is to attempt to cause the
officer to lose his professional bearing, i.e. to provoke a response. These are
'fighting words').
187. Clay Calvert, PersonalizingFirst Amendment Jurisprudence:Shifting
Audiences & Imagined Communities to Determine Message Protection in
Obscenity, Fighting Words, and Defamation, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 439,
459 (2009).
188. It should be noted, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court "has not
directly addressed whether the middle finger gesture constitutes fighting
words." Ira P. Robbins, Digitus Impudicus: The Middle Fingerand the Law, 41
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1403, 1426 (2008). If the teenagers giving the middle
finger to each other were on public school campus, the fighting words doctrine
would not need to be used to punish them because, under the Supreme Court's
ruling in Tinker v. Des Moines Community Independent School District, 393
U.S. 503 (1969), "a school can punish a student for using the middle finger
gesture in a school setting if the school can show that the student's actions
would substantially and materially disrupt the educational process." Id. at 1471.
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at least one federal court has ruled that when the same offensive
digital form of symbolic expression' is "used against a universe
of teachers, [it] is not likely to provoke a violent response"l9 0 and
thus does not fall within the fighting words exception. 9 '
Thus, adapting a different fighting words threshold when the
target of the speech is a minor-rather than a police officer, a
teacher or an average adult-is possible. The argument, in brief, is
this: If police officers must withstand more verbal abuse than the
average adult under the fighting words doctrine, then surely it
seems logical to hold that minors, particularly those grappling with
gender and sexual-orientation issues, must withstand less verbal
abuse than the average adult.
A major hurdle in making the fighting words doctrine applicable
to one-on-one texting and e-mailing between minors is the fact that
these forms of communication are not in-person, face-to-face
messages. For instance, U.S. District Judge Terrence F. McVerry
observed in 2007 that "a 'MySpace' [I]nternet page is not outside
of the protections of the First Amendment under the fighting
words doctrine because there is simply no in-person confrontation
in cyberspace such that physical violence is likely to be
instigated." 9 2 Indeed, when analyzing whether fighting words
exist, courts examine whether there is "a confrontational face-toface exchange."' 93 As the Supreme Court of Missouri observed,
"offensive language can be statutorily prohibited only if it is
personally abusive, addressed in a face-to-face manner to a
specific individual and uttered under circumstances such that the
words have a direct tendency to cause an immediate violent
response by a reasonable recipient."'9 4 Thus, writing personally
189. See generally James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message
from Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (2008) (providing a current and
comprehensive review and analysis of the symbolic speech doctrine).
190. Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1441 n.3 (D. Me. 1986).
191. Id. at 1442.
192. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 602 (W.D. Pa.
2007), aff'd, 593 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7362
(Apr. 9, 2010) (emphasis added).
193. Spiller v. Texas City, 130 F.3d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 1997).
194. Missouri v. Carpenter, 736 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Mo. 1987) (emphasis
added).
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abusive epithets in the note line on a bank check does not
constitute fighting words because messages conveyed on checks
are "clearly not face-to-face communications." 9 5
There is emerging case law, however, holding that e-mails
containing personally abusive epithets can constitute fighting
words. In August 2009, for instance, the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals-the state's intermediate appellate court-in
Davidson v. Seneca CrossingSection HI Homeowner's Association,
Inc.'9 6 considered a case involving a series of e-mails that referred
directly to the recipients of those e-mails as, among other things:
* "ballbusting trash"'97
* "mercenary cunt"'9
* "beeeeYatch" 99
* "buttsquirt" 200 and

* "motherfucker." 20 1
In upholding a lower-court injunction prohibiting the individual
from sending e-mails with such language directly to the same
recipients in the future, the appellate court wrote that:
It is clear from the record and the findings of fact
that much of appellant's behavior consisted of the
use of "fighting words." Without repeating the
language used by appellant against appellees, we
conclude that appellant regularly employed
"personally abusive epithets which .

.

. [were] ...

inherently likelyto provoke violent reaction." 20 2
In addition to the ruling in Davidson, the Nebraska Supreme

195. Bd. Managers Old Colony Vill. Condo. v. Preu, 2009 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 417 at *47 (Oct. 21, 2009).
196. 979 A.2d 260 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009).
197. Id. at 270.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Davidson, 979 A.2d at 283 (quoting Dziekonski v. Maryland, 732 A.2d
367, 372 (Md. 1999)) (emphasis added).
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Court's decision in Nebraska v. Drahota20 3 discussed in the
Introduction suggests that the fighting words doctrine may apply to
one-on-one e-mailed messages filled with personally abusive
epithets if:
* the target of the speech is a private person rather than a
political candidate; 20 4
* the speech is not about politics; 205 and
* the target-recipient of the e-mail possesses the ability to
immediately retaliate.206
Ultimately, extension of the fighting words doctrine to cyberbullying scenarios among minors involving e-mails, texts and
instant messages must be narrowly tailored and carefully crafted so
as to both: 1) remain as faithful as possible to the current
requirementsof the doctrine; and 2) not sweep up within its reach
speech that meritsprotection.
Judge Richard Posner wrote a decade ago, when considering the
validity of law targeting minors' access to violent video games in
arcades, that "[w]e are in the world of kids' popular culture. But it
is not lightly to be suppressed."207 Just like video games, texting
and instant messaging today are an integral part of the social lives
and culture of minors, and suppressing the speech aspects of
minors' lives should not be taken lightly simply because some
adults may believe that texting lingo is silly due to all of the
"acronyms, words missing vowels and a complete lack of

203. 788 N.W.2d 796 (Neb. 2010).
204. See Drahota,788 N.W.2d at 805 (While Avery, as a political candidate,
had diminished privacy rights trumped by a potential constituent's First
Amendment rights, we recognize that balancing free speech rights against the
privacy rights of a private citizen may yield a different result").
205. Id. (stating that "[o]bviously, Drahota is not a wordsmith, and his
bumper sticker rhetoric was certainly provocative. But it did not rise to the level
of fighting words under these facts. If the First Amendment protects anything, it
protects political speech and the right to disagree").
206. Id. at 804 (reasoning that "even if a fact finder could conclude that in a
face-to-face confrontation, Drahota's speech would have provoked an
immediate retaliation, Avery could not have immediately retaliated. Avery did
not know who sent the e-mails, let alone where to find the author")
207. Am. Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578 (7th
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001).
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capitalization."20 8
In light of these concerns, this article asserts that any judicial
modification and expansion of the fighting words doctrine
designed to address cyber-bullying by minors must be confined
and cabined to situations in which each of the following three
variables is present:
1. The electronic message must be conveyed by the alleged
bully-sender directly to the target-recipientof the bullying in a
one-on-one fashion. This element stays true to the notion that
fighting words must be directed to a specific person.209 The
electronic messages would include a text, instant message or email sent by the alleged bully-sender directly to his or her targetrecipient. In contrast, the posting of an insulting or personally
abusive message by a bully on a website or on a Facebook wall
visible to others does not suffice.
2. The alleged bully-sender and the target-recipientmust be in
such close geographic proximity that a physical response by the
target could occur within a matter of only a few minutes. This
requirement remains true to the fighting words doctrine's elements
of both face-to-face confrontation and imminence of responsive
violence. 210 Drawing bright lines in terms of a precise distance the
bully and victim must be away from each other and exactly how
much time can elapse between speech and responsive violence is
undesirable, as courts need flexibility to consider the totality of
circumstances and the unique facts of any given case.2 1'
3. The content of the texted, IM'ed or e-mailed message
transmitted by the bully-sender must be so personally abusive of
the target-recipient that responsive violence from a reasonable
208. Stephanie Dunnewind, A Text of the Times, LEXINGTON HERALD
LEADER (Ky.), May 22, 2003, at E1.

209. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
211. Defamation law, for instance, allows for such flexibility in groupdefamation scenarios where more than just the precise size of a group is
considered on the element of identification. As Professor Robert Trager and his
colleagues recently wrote, "Where is the line to be drawn? How many members
must a group include before it crosses the threshold from small enough to too
big? Like so much in the law, there is no definitive answer." ROBERT TRAGER
ET AL., THE LAW OF JOURNALISM & MASS COMMUNICATION 140 (2d ed. 2010).
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minor in the position of the target-recipientis likely to occur. This
element stays true to the likelihood or probability element of
fighting words.212 It mandates that courts employ an objective
standard of likeliness by requiring the consideration of the
response of a reasonable minor with the same characteristics
(sexual orientation, for instance) as the actual target-recipient of
the speech. Such an objective component tracks the U.S. Supreme
Court's requirement in harassment cases that "the objective
severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a
reasonableperson in the plaintiffs position, considering 'all the
circumstances."' 2 13 It also mirrors the objectivity requirement in
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress that the
emotional distress suffered must be "so severe that no reasonable
person could be expected to endure it." 214
By keeping this trio of considerations in mind when attempting
to apply the fighting words doctrine to cyber-bullying scenarios,
courts hopefully will neither stray too far for the core components
of the existing doctrine nor veer off into the realm of censoring
speech that merely offends.
IV. CONCLUSION

At this stage, a quartet of points should be abundantly clear.
First, bullying and, in particular, cyber-bullying are of critical
national concern due to the deadly consequences those insidious
behaviors may foster.2 15 Second, the problem has garnered the
attention of lawmakers nationwide who now are groping for

212. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
213. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998)
(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)) (emphasis added).
214. Thomas v. BSE Industrial Contractors, Inc., 624 So. 2d 1041, 1043
(Ala. 1993) (emphasis added).
215. See generally Nancy Cambria, School Bullying on U.S. Agenda, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 9, 2010, at Apr. 9, 2010, at Al (describing "a

raging debate on school bullies" and noting that "prominent national cases in
which bullying - particularly online and through texting - may have contributed
to suicides has led leaders to scrutinize the schools' role in controlling such
behavior, and its overall impact on children and school performance.").

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

45

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2

46

DEPAUL JART, TECH. &IP LAW

[Vol. XXI:l

legislative ways to rein in cyber-bullying.2 16 Third, squelching
cyber-bullying necessarily raises First Amendment questions to the
extent that cyber-bullying involves the free speech rights of minors
and because the line between protected and unprotected expression
is not always clear when it comes to texted and e-mailed
messages.2 17 Fourth, the aging fighting words doctrine that was
created long before the advent of text messages and e-mails may,
depending upon how narrowly or expansively it is construed
today, provide one mechanism for courts to declare that particular
instances of cyber-bullying by and between minors fall outside the
scope of First Amendment protection.
As it now stands, the fighting words doctrine is "narrowly
confined"2 18 to situations involving "face to face insults which, it is
feared, will provoke a reasonable person to violence."2 19 As
described above, the face-to-face component would need to be
expanded to text-to-text situations, and the average person would
need to be changed to take into account the sensibilities of an
average minor (rather than an adult) in the same position of the
bully's target (an average minor possessing similar ethnic, gender,
religious, sexual-orientation and other characteristics as the bully's
target).
Ultimately, of course, it is left to judges and justices to
determine whether the fighting words doctrine will be modified to
adapt to the new and ever-changing modes of communication with
which today's youth are particularly comfortable and conversant.
As UCLA psychology professors Kaveri Subrahmanyam and
Patricia Greenfield observe, "teens are heavy users of new
communication forms such as instant messaging, e-mail and
216. Supra notes 40 - 46 and accompanying text.
217. See generally Abbott Koloff, States Pushfor Cyberbully Controls, USA
TODAY, Feb. 7, 2008, at 3A (noting that "cyberbullying laws could lead to
freedom-of-speech challenges," and quoting Vito Gagliardi, a New Jersey
attorney who represents school districts, for the proposition that "[t]here's not a
Available at
large body of case law that addresses that issue").
(last
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-02-06-CyberbullyingN.htm
visited Dec. 13, 2010).
218. John F. Wirenius, The Road Not Taken: The Curse of Chaplinsky, 24
CAP. U. L. REv. 331, 362 (1995).
219. Id.
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texting messaging"22 and that, "among youth today, the popular
communication forms include e-mail, instant messaging, [and] text
messaging." 2 1 Courts too recognize the importance of these forms
of electronic media as an essential part of teen communication

today. 222
Neither texting nor teens that bully via texts are likely to
disappear anytime soon. According to one survey conducted in
late 2008, teens in the United States sent and received, on average,
a whopping eighty texts each day.223 It is doubtful that all of those
incoming texts were welcome and some, in fact, might have
provoked a violent reaction from a recipient. That is where the
fighting words doctrine, this article has argued, may-not
necessarily must or should-come into play.
The real challenge facing the legal system wrought by cyberbullying is to attempt to mitigate the negative uses and detrimental
consequences to minors of electronic communication technologies
while simultaneously preserving the First Amendment speech
interests possessed by minors, as well as the more valuable uses of
the new technologies in question. This tension is rather axiomatic;
as Amy Jordan, Director of the Media and the Developing Child
Sector of the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of
Pennsylvania, recently wrote, "in American society, freedom of
speech sometimes comes into conflict with the need to protect

children." 224
With texting and instant messaging between minors, this conflict
involves a dialectical dance between those in support of the speech
rights of one minor-the alleged bully-and those in support of the

220. Kaveri Subrahmanyam & Patricia Greenfield, Online Communication
and Adolescent Relationships, 18 FUTURE OF CHILD. 119, 120 (2008), available
at http://futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/ 18_01_06.pdf.
221. Id.
222. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211, 223 (D. Conn. 2009)
(asserting that "[t]oday, students are connected to each other through email,
instant messaging, blogs, social networking sites, and text messages").
223. See Carol L. Tilley, Texting, SCH. LIBR. MONTHLY, Sept. 2009, at 40
(providing the results of a Nielsen poll).
224. Amy B. Jordan, Children's Media Policy, 18 FUTURE OF CHILD. 235,
236 (2008).
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safety rights of another minor-the target/victim of the bully.225 Put
differently, there is a tension between freedom of speech and
freedom from physical/emotional abuse. The aging fighting words
doctrine, if narrowly modified, can provide one legal mechanism
for addressing that tension.

225. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "there is a
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors." Sable Commc'ns Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
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